"Action as the Conclusion of Practical Reasoning; The Critique of a Rödlian Account." forthcoming in The European Journal of Philosophy
Abstract
In this paper I take up the question of whether and in what sense action might be the conclusion of practical reasoning and argue against the answer provided by Sebastian Rödl's account of practical reasoning by focussing on Anscombe's practical knowledge. Rödl's account aspires to steer a middle ground between the attitudinal and the neo-Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning, by proposing that its conclusion is at once a thought and a movement. This account is worth considering for it promises to explain both practical reasoning’s practicality (that it brings about action) and its rationality (that it is subject to thought governing norms) in one move. But, I argue in this paper, a Rödlian account -an account which grants Rödl's central theses- fails to deliver on its promise. The reason is that, like others, a Rödlian also assumes that the only sense in which practical reasoning is practical is the sense in which it has a conclusion. Challenging this assumption in the right way, I finally suggest, helps us reassess the task of explaining practical reasoning in a way that goes beyond Rödlian, attitudinal and neo-Aristotelian accounts alike.
Abstract
In this paper I take up the question of whether and in what sense action might be the conclusion of practical reasoning and argue against the answer provided by Sebastian Rödl's account of practical reasoning by focussing on Anscombe's practical knowledge. Rödl's account aspires to steer a middle ground between the attitudinal and the neo-Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning, by proposing that its conclusion is at once a thought and a movement. This account is worth considering for it promises to explain both practical reasoning’s practicality (that it brings about action) and its rationality (that it is subject to thought governing norms) in one move. But, I argue in this paper, a Rödlian account -an account which grants Rödl's central theses- fails to deliver on its promise. The reason is that, like others, a Rödlian also assumes that the only sense in which practical reasoning is practical is the sense in which it has a conclusion. Challenging this assumption in the right way, I finally suggest, helps us reassess the task of explaining practical reasoning in a way that goes beyond Rödlian, attitudinal and neo-Aristotelian accounts alike.
Critical Discussion of John Hyman's Action, Knowledge and Will
The Philosophical Quarterly, published online March 28, 2016.
Abstract
Action, Knowledge and Will takes the traditional question whether we should give a physical, ethical, psychological or intellectualaccount of human action and stands it on its head. For Hyman argues that the real question is how to distinguish the physical, the ethical, the psychological and the intellectual dimensions of human action, and he thereby changes the landscape in the philosophy of action. He presents the history of the philosophy of action as something more than a philosophical mutation arising in the 1950s and bearing a thematic relation to Aristotle's and Hume's work. He dethrones Witggenstein and Ryle without discarding their critical project. He undermines the authority of both the Anscombean and the Davidsonian legacy. He shows what broader metaphysical work a true metaphysics of action requires and what pervasive epistemological consequences this metaphysics has. And he explains how we should approach ethics from the action-theoretic perspective and what place the philosophical psychology of action has between metaphysics and epistemology. In this review, I trace the dialectic that affects this change and suggest that the change is so radical that it might even undermine John Hyman's own answer to it.
The Philosophical Quarterly, published online March 28, 2016.
Abstract
Action, Knowledge and Will takes the traditional question whether we should give a physical, ethical, psychological or intellectualaccount of human action and stands it on its head. For Hyman argues that the real question is how to distinguish the physical, the ethical, the psychological and the intellectual dimensions of human action, and he thereby changes the landscape in the philosophy of action. He presents the history of the philosophy of action as something more than a philosophical mutation arising in the 1950s and bearing a thematic relation to Aristotle's and Hume's work. He dethrones Witggenstein and Ryle without discarding their critical project. He undermines the authority of both the Anscombean and the Davidsonian legacy. He shows what broader metaphysical work a true metaphysics of action requires and what pervasive epistemological consequences this metaphysics has. And he explains how we should approach ethics from the action-theoretic perspective and what place the philosophical psychology of action has between metaphysics and epistemology. In this review, I trace the dialectic that affects this change and suggest that the change is so radical that it might even undermine John Hyman's own answer to it.
Practical Knowledge and Moral Perception
in Theories of Action and Morality, Mark Alznauer and Josse Torralba (ed.), Georg Olms Verlag, 2016.
Abstract
In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between Elizabeth Anscombe's knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and Iris Murdoch's knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances). If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) turn out to constitute exercises of one and the same capacity for knowledge, as I will argue they do, this will give us strong reason to believe that what is known in the two cases (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.
In examining the relation between practical knowledge of one’s own intentional actions and practical knowledge of what is good to do I draw from two traditions of thought on practical epistemology. The first is the tradition of Anscombe’s conception of knowledge in action and the second is the tradition of Murdoch’s conception of knowledge in the circumstances. What is striking about these traditions is that they tend to understand practical knowledge by reference to the possible involvement therein of perception. Thus Anscombe claims in her Intention[1] that knowledge in action is specified as knowledge without observation; a claim to the effect that the epistemological status of knowledge in action is determined by reference to the lack of a certain sort of involvement therein of perception. And Iris Murdoch in her Sovereignty of the Good[2] proposes that what makes knowledge in the circumstances knowledge is a form of sensitivity to particular features or aspects of the circumstances in which the agent finds herself. Thus, for Murdoch, knowledge in the circumstances owes its status as knowledge to the capacity of the agent to perceive what she ought to do in particular circumstances.
In this paper I will argue that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge. But the question now arises. How can we both claim that the two forms of practical knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge and that perception plays such a diverse role in their epistemological grounding? In the main body of this paper I will show how to interpret the Murdochian and the Anscombean claims so as to provide the materials with which we can answer this question. If the argument of this paper works, it will transpire that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of our capacity for self-knowledge. This account of practical knowledge opens the way for understanding intentional action and the moral fabric of the world as knowable as the self. And it is thus that what is known in the two forms of knowing (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.
[1] Anscombe, 1957.
[2] Murdoch, 1970.
in Theories of Action and Morality, Mark Alznauer and Josse Torralba (ed.), Georg Olms Verlag, 2016.
Abstract
In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between Elizabeth Anscombe's knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and Iris Murdoch's knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances). If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) turn out to constitute exercises of one and the same capacity for knowledge, as I will argue they do, this will give us strong reason to believe that what is known in the two cases (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.
In examining the relation between practical knowledge of one’s own intentional actions and practical knowledge of what is good to do I draw from two traditions of thought on practical epistemology. The first is the tradition of Anscombe’s conception of knowledge in action and the second is the tradition of Murdoch’s conception of knowledge in the circumstances. What is striking about these traditions is that they tend to understand practical knowledge by reference to the possible involvement therein of perception. Thus Anscombe claims in her Intention[1] that knowledge in action is specified as knowledge without observation; a claim to the effect that the epistemological status of knowledge in action is determined by reference to the lack of a certain sort of involvement therein of perception. And Iris Murdoch in her Sovereignty of the Good[2] proposes that what makes knowledge in the circumstances knowledge is a form of sensitivity to particular features or aspects of the circumstances in which the agent finds herself. Thus, for Murdoch, knowledge in the circumstances owes its status as knowledge to the capacity of the agent to perceive what she ought to do in particular circumstances.
In this paper I will argue that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge. But the question now arises. How can we both claim that the two forms of practical knowledge are instances of the exercise of one and the same capacity for knowledge and that perception plays such a diverse role in their epistemological grounding? In the main body of this paper I will show how to interpret the Murdochian and the Anscombean claims so as to provide the materials with which we can answer this question. If the argument of this paper works, it will transpire that both of these forms of knowledge are instances of the exercise of our capacity for self-knowledge. This account of practical knowledge opens the way for understanding intentional action and the moral fabric of the world as knowable as the self. And it is thus that what is known in the two forms of knowing (i.e. intentional action and the moral fabric of the world) is in some sense the same.
[1] Anscombe, 1957.
[2] Murdoch, 1970.
Instrumental and Telic Normativity (draft)
Abstract
In this paper I interpret contemporary debates on instrumental reason as attempts to explain the relation between instrumental normativity (the normativity governing the execution of one’s aims) and telic normativity (the normativity governing the choice of one’s aims) without divorcing the one from the other and without reducing the one to the other. In the first part I consider narrow and wide scope accounts which take instrumental normativity to belong to the so-called normativity of rationality (the normativity governing the relations between our attitudes) and telic normativity to belong to the so-called normativity of reasons (the normativity governing the relation between our attitudes and facts). And in the second part I consider Thompsonian and Kantian constitutivist accounts which take instrumental normativity to be what governs the constitution of intentional action as a means-end unity and telic normativity to be the normativity which governs the choice of such a means-end unity. But, I will argue, the problem persists on both interpretations: We lack an explanation of the relation between instrumental and telic normativity which neither divorces the one from the other nor reduces the one to the other. In the third part I sketch a classical constitutivist account which addresses this problem directly. On this account, instrumental normativity has its source in telic normativity, because a) telic normativity is the normativity of the perfection of one’s activity, b) the perfection of one’s activity is a historical and material achievement, and so c) may be ascertained and realized only if the activity is allowed to unfold internally. But this, the internal unfolding of one’s activity is guaranteed only when one does something because one takes the means to one’s end and for no other reason. So that the normativity of the perfection of one’s activity is what demands that one takes the means to one’s end as such and so what constitutes the source of instrumental normativity. But instrumental normativity is not reduced to telic normativity, because the normativity of perfection and the normativity of the internal unfolding of an activity relate to each other as the realization of an ability and the realization of an ability qua ability.
Abstract
In this paper I interpret contemporary debates on instrumental reason as attempts to explain the relation between instrumental normativity (the normativity governing the execution of one’s aims) and telic normativity (the normativity governing the choice of one’s aims) without divorcing the one from the other and without reducing the one to the other. In the first part I consider narrow and wide scope accounts which take instrumental normativity to belong to the so-called normativity of rationality (the normativity governing the relations between our attitudes) and telic normativity to belong to the so-called normativity of reasons (the normativity governing the relation between our attitudes and facts). And in the second part I consider Thompsonian and Kantian constitutivist accounts which take instrumental normativity to be what governs the constitution of intentional action as a means-end unity and telic normativity to be the normativity which governs the choice of such a means-end unity. But, I will argue, the problem persists on both interpretations: We lack an explanation of the relation between instrumental and telic normativity which neither divorces the one from the other nor reduces the one to the other. In the third part I sketch a classical constitutivist account which addresses this problem directly. On this account, instrumental normativity has its source in telic normativity, because a) telic normativity is the normativity of the perfection of one’s activity, b) the perfection of one’s activity is a historical and material achievement, and so c) may be ascertained and realized only if the activity is allowed to unfold internally. But this, the internal unfolding of one’s activity is guaranteed only when one does something because one takes the means to one’s end and for no other reason. So that the normativity of the perfection of one’s activity is what demands that one takes the means to one’s end as such and so what constitutes the source of instrumental normativity. But instrumental normativity is not reduced to telic normativity, because the normativity of perfection and the normativity of the internal unfolding of an activity relate to each other as the realization of an ability and the realization of an ability qua ability.
Practical Reasoning as Ability, draft
Extended Abstract
On a common understanding, practical reasoning is reasoning which issues in a certain way in action. But what reasoning and action are and how exactly one issues in the other, or else what practical reasoning is, has been a matter of dispute. The dispute has taken many guises and focused on a variety of questions.[i] In one guise, it entertains the Aristotelian thought that practical reasoning concludes in action[ii] and raises the question of whether and in what sense this might be true. The aim of this paper is to propose an account of practical reasoning which makes sense of this claim without falling prey to the problems that standard accounts of the conclusion of practical reasoning face.
On the attitudinal accounts[iii] of practical reasoning, practical reasoning is the passage from thought to thought which is distinguished from other reasoning (speculative reasoning) by what follows from or accompanies its conclusion. Thus, on the attitudinal accounts, practical reasoning is the passage from one or more propositional attitudes to a propositional attitude towards an action, which itself may or may not follow or accompany the reasoning. Depending on the view, these attitudes are evaluative beliefs, desires, judgments, intentions, etc.. And they are expressed by propositions of the form ‘I should do A’ or ‘It is good/best/etc. to do A’ or ‘I shall/will do A’, etc., where A is the action that may or may not follow or accompany this attitude. But the attitudinal accounts are hard-pressed to explain what in this passage brings about action when action does follow or accompany the agent’s reasoning. Otherwise they cannot do justice to the intuition that practical reasoning counts as practical in virtue of what it brings about and not in virtue of its subject matter.
Neo-Aristotelian accounts propose that to explain practical reasoning’s practicality we must take it that its conclusion just is the action.[iv] In suggesting this they assume that the norms which govern the passage from thought to thought are (instances of) generic norms which may also govern the passage from thought to movement. In other words, these accounts accept that there are generic norms -norms which govern the passage from premises to conclusion- and suggest that these norms govern the passage from certain thoughts to a conclusion which may either be a thought or an action. And, thus, they propose to explain that practical reasoning is practical in virtue of what it brings about and not in virtue of its subject matter. But these neo-Aristotelian accounts are equally hard-pressed to explain when these generic norms (the norms which govern the passage from premises to conclusion) govern the passage from thought to thought and when they govern the passage from thought to action. Otherwise, to say, as they do, that reasoning is practical when its conclusion just is an action is to posit the existence of practical reasoning but not to explain its nature. And this would be to reawaken the original disquiet with the Aristotelian thought.[v]
Neo-Kantian accounts[vi] propose to free us from this problem by proposing an account of practical reasoning on which reasoning is the passage from thought to thought when the reality of the concluding thought just is the reality of the action. Practical reasoning, on these accounts, is the passage from thoughts figuring in the premises to a thought (an act of the mind) which is the conclusion and whose reality is the same as the reality of the action in its progressive description (what one is doing as opposed to what one has done). So that practical reasoning may both count as reasoning -i.e. constitute the passage from thought to thought that is governed by thought specific norms- and count as practical given the third intuition above –i.e. be what brings about action and not merely what concerns action. But these accounts cannot do justice to the fact that knowledge by practical reasoning (practical knowledge in Anscombe’s sense) may be knowledge of action in its perfective description (what one has done as opposed to what one is doing). And so that practical reasoning may issue in action in its perfective description also.
In the first part of this paper I will briefly sketch the problems that these accounts face and in the second part I will propose an account that deals with these problems.
On the account I will propose practical reasoning should be conceived of as an ability where the analysis of the being of the ability is given in Aristotelian terms. To give this analysis I will assume Aryeh Kosman’s account of the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality in the “The Activity of Being” [vii]. That is, I will assume the distinction between an ability, the realization of the ability qua ability and the realization of the ability. First I will propose that we should distinguish between syllogism, deliberation or action in its progressive description and action in its perfective description on the basis of the distinction between determinable, realization of determinable qua determinable and realization of determinable. On this proposal, reasoning as determinable (syllogism) is the logically articulated structure of terms which can be determined as an action or a belief. Reasoning as the realization of determinable qua determinable is either the process of determining a syllogism as what is the case (theoretical inquiry or coming to believe) or the process of determining a syllogism as what one is doing (deliberation or coming to do). And reasoning as the realization of the determinable can be either the syllogism which is has been determined as what is the case (as one’s belief) or the syllogism which has been determined as what is done (as one’s action). And then I will argue that this distinction corresponds to the distinction between the power, the exercise and the outcome of the agent’s ability to reason. When considered as power the ability to reason is defined disjunctively and the scope of the disjunction[1]is narrow. In the terminology I shall be using, the ability to reason is the capacity to determine either* [a belief, an action]; that is, the ability to (follow logical rules to) formulate syllogisms. Whereas, when considered as exercise the ability to reason is again defined disjunctively, but the scope of the disjunction is, this time, wide: the ability to reason is either* [the ability to determine (a syllogism as) one’s belief, the ability to determine (a syllogism as) one’s action]. Finally, when considered as outcome the ability to reason is either* [(a syllogism which is determined as) one’s belief, (a syllogism which is determined as) one’s action].
Given this explanation of practical reasoning, we may see that the accounts above talk past each other. When attitudinal accounts talk about practical reasoning they mainly refer to the ability to reason qua power; when neo-Aristotelian accounts talk about practical reaoning they mainly refer to the practical outcome of the ability to reason and when neo-Kantian accounts talk about practical reasoning they talk about the practical exercise of the ability to reason. Thus, the attitudinal accounts do justice to the sense in which practical reasoning is syllogism (a determinable either as action or as belief); neo-Aristotelian accounts do justice to the sense in which practical reasoning is the determination of syllogism as what is done; and neo Kantians do jsutice to the sense in which practical syllogism is the determination of syllogism as what one is doing. Each of them gets something right about practical reasoning but all of them make the same mistake: they neglect the fact that practical reasoning is an ability and as such may admit of the Aristotelian distinction between ability as such (potentiality), the realization of the ability qua ability (the actualization of potentiality qua potentiality) and the realization of the ability (the realization of potentiality).
In this sense, my aim in this paper is to explain what it means to say that practical reasoning is an ability.
[1] On the interpretation of disjunction in English as a scope bearing element see Rooth, M., and Partee, B., ‘Conjunction, Type Ambiguity and Wide Scope Or” in Flickenger, D., Macken., M. and Wiegand, N., (eds.), Proceedings of the First West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics, Linguistics Dept, Standford University.
Notes
[i] For instance, the nature of instrumental reasoning, the relation between motivation and justification, etc.
[ii] See, for instance, De Anima (434a18–21), Nicomachean Ethics (1147a27–28), and De Motu Animalium (701a8–20) in Aristotle 1984.
[iii] See, for instance, Audi 1989; Raz 1978; Broome 2002; Paul 2013.
[iv] See, for instance, Dancy 2004; Tenenbaum 2007.
[v] For a systematic explanation of the intuition that the major premise of a syllogism must be of the same form as its conclusion see Wiland 2013.
[vi] See Rodl 2007.
[vii] See Kosman 2013.
Extended Abstract
On a common understanding, practical reasoning is reasoning which issues in a certain way in action. But what reasoning and action are and how exactly one issues in the other, or else what practical reasoning is, has been a matter of dispute. The dispute has taken many guises and focused on a variety of questions.[i] In one guise, it entertains the Aristotelian thought that practical reasoning concludes in action[ii] and raises the question of whether and in what sense this might be true. The aim of this paper is to propose an account of practical reasoning which makes sense of this claim without falling prey to the problems that standard accounts of the conclusion of practical reasoning face.
On the attitudinal accounts[iii] of practical reasoning, practical reasoning is the passage from thought to thought which is distinguished from other reasoning (speculative reasoning) by what follows from or accompanies its conclusion. Thus, on the attitudinal accounts, practical reasoning is the passage from one or more propositional attitudes to a propositional attitude towards an action, which itself may or may not follow or accompany the reasoning. Depending on the view, these attitudes are evaluative beliefs, desires, judgments, intentions, etc.. And they are expressed by propositions of the form ‘I should do A’ or ‘It is good/best/etc. to do A’ or ‘I shall/will do A’, etc., where A is the action that may or may not follow or accompany this attitude. But the attitudinal accounts are hard-pressed to explain what in this passage brings about action when action does follow or accompany the agent’s reasoning. Otherwise they cannot do justice to the intuition that practical reasoning counts as practical in virtue of what it brings about and not in virtue of its subject matter.
Neo-Aristotelian accounts propose that to explain practical reasoning’s practicality we must take it that its conclusion just is the action.[iv] In suggesting this they assume that the norms which govern the passage from thought to thought are (instances of) generic norms which may also govern the passage from thought to movement. In other words, these accounts accept that there are generic norms -norms which govern the passage from premises to conclusion- and suggest that these norms govern the passage from certain thoughts to a conclusion which may either be a thought or an action. And, thus, they propose to explain that practical reasoning is practical in virtue of what it brings about and not in virtue of its subject matter. But these neo-Aristotelian accounts are equally hard-pressed to explain when these generic norms (the norms which govern the passage from premises to conclusion) govern the passage from thought to thought and when they govern the passage from thought to action. Otherwise, to say, as they do, that reasoning is practical when its conclusion just is an action is to posit the existence of practical reasoning but not to explain its nature. And this would be to reawaken the original disquiet with the Aristotelian thought.[v]
Neo-Kantian accounts[vi] propose to free us from this problem by proposing an account of practical reasoning on which reasoning is the passage from thought to thought when the reality of the concluding thought just is the reality of the action. Practical reasoning, on these accounts, is the passage from thoughts figuring in the premises to a thought (an act of the mind) which is the conclusion and whose reality is the same as the reality of the action in its progressive description (what one is doing as opposed to what one has done). So that practical reasoning may both count as reasoning -i.e. constitute the passage from thought to thought that is governed by thought specific norms- and count as practical given the third intuition above –i.e. be what brings about action and not merely what concerns action. But these accounts cannot do justice to the fact that knowledge by practical reasoning (practical knowledge in Anscombe’s sense) may be knowledge of action in its perfective description (what one has done as opposed to what one is doing). And so that practical reasoning may issue in action in its perfective description also.
In the first part of this paper I will briefly sketch the problems that these accounts face and in the second part I will propose an account that deals with these problems.
On the account I will propose practical reasoning should be conceived of as an ability where the analysis of the being of the ability is given in Aristotelian terms. To give this analysis I will assume Aryeh Kosman’s account of the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality in the “The Activity of Being” [vii]. That is, I will assume the distinction between an ability, the realization of the ability qua ability and the realization of the ability. First I will propose that we should distinguish between syllogism, deliberation or action in its progressive description and action in its perfective description on the basis of the distinction between determinable, realization of determinable qua determinable and realization of determinable. On this proposal, reasoning as determinable (syllogism) is the logically articulated structure of terms which can be determined as an action or a belief. Reasoning as the realization of determinable qua determinable is either the process of determining a syllogism as what is the case (theoretical inquiry or coming to believe) or the process of determining a syllogism as what one is doing (deliberation or coming to do). And reasoning as the realization of the determinable can be either the syllogism which is has been determined as what is the case (as one’s belief) or the syllogism which has been determined as what is done (as one’s action). And then I will argue that this distinction corresponds to the distinction between the power, the exercise and the outcome of the agent’s ability to reason. When considered as power the ability to reason is defined disjunctively and the scope of the disjunction[1]is narrow. In the terminology I shall be using, the ability to reason is the capacity to determine either* [a belief, an action]; that is, the ability to (follow logical rules to) formulate syllogisms. Whereas, when considered as exercise the ability to reason is again defined disjunctively, but the scope of the disjunction is, this time, wide: the ability to reason is either* [the ability to determine (a syllogism as) one’s belief, the ability to determine (a syllogism as) one’s action]. Finally, when considered as outcome the ability to reason is either* [(a syllogism which is determined as) one’s belief, (a syllogism which is determined as) one’s action].
Given this explanation of practical reasoning, we may see that the accounts above talk past each other. When attitudinal accounts talk about practical reasoning they mainly refer to the ability to reason qua power; when neo-Aristotelian accounts talk about practical reaoning they mainly refer to the practical outcome of the ability to reason and when neo-Kantian accounts talk about practical reasoning they talk about the practical exercise of the ability to reason. Thus, the attitudinal accounts do justice to the sense in which practical reasoning is syllogism (a determinable either as action or as belief); neo-Aristotelian accounts do justice to the sense in which practical reasoning is the determination of syllogism as what is done; and neo Kantians do jsutice to the sense in which practical syllogism is the determination of syllogism as what one is doing. Each of them gets something right about practical reasoning but all of them make the same mistake: they neglect the fact that practical reasoning is an ability and as such may admit of the Aristotelian distinction between ability as such (potentiality), the realization of the ability qua ability (the actualization of potentiality qua potentiality) and the realization of the ability (the realization of potentiality).
In this sense, my aim in this paper is to explain what it means to say that practical reasoning is an ability.
[1] On the interpretation of disjunction in English as a scope bearing element see Rooth, M., and Partee, B., ‘Conjunction, Type Ambiguity and Wide Scope Or” in Flickenger, D., Macken., M. and Wiegand, N., (eds.), Proceedings of the First West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics, Linguistics Dept, Standford University.
Notes
[i] For instance, the nature of instrumental reasoning, the relation between motivation and justification, etc.
[ii] See, for instance, De Anima (434a18–21), Nicomachean Ethics (1147a27–28), and De Motu Animalium (701a8–20) in Aristotle 1984.
[iii] See, for instance, Audi 1989; Raz 1978; Broome 2002; Paul 2013.
[iv] See, for instance, Dancy 2004; Tenenbaum 2007.
[v] For a systematic explanation of the intuition that the major premise of a syllogism must be of the same form as its conclusion see Wiland 2013.
[vi] See Rodl 2007.
[vii] See Kosman 2013.
Judgments of Practice and Life
forthcoming in G. Maggini, J. Vila-Cha, J. Hogan, (eds.), Philosophy and Crisis: Responding to Challenges to Ways of Life in the Contemporary World, Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP)-Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.
Abstract
There are at least two ways to think of the very idea of a way of life. On the first, a way of life is contrasted to life in something like the way conceptual scheme is contrasted to content in Davidson’s formulation of the third dogma of empiricism. To echo Davidson we might say that on this picture a way of life is either what organizes or fits life; where life should be understood as what remains even when all ways of life have been wiped out. On the second, to live for us humans just is to have a way of life. To put it negatively, on this conception, it is not possible to strip human beings of their way of life down to a sort of living which transcends all ways of life; whether this be conceived of as human, animal or bare life, to use Agamben’s often quoted phrase.
In this paper I attempt to strip the first way of thinking of its air of intuitiveness and I sketch of conception on which having a way of life might be what living comes down to in the case of human life.
To do so I first suggest that “a way of life” is represented in terms of what I shall be calling we-judgments or judgments of practice; judgments of the form “We do S”. Then, assuming Michael Thompson’s conception of the logical form of life in general, I present the two lines of thinking above as two conceptions of the logical form of human life. And finally, I argue for two things: First, that the former conception makes human life un-recognizable as such, and second, that the latter conception can do justice to the phenomena of human life, on a certain understanding of a way of life.
forthcoming in G. Maggini, J. Vila-Cha, J. Hogan, (eds.), Philosophy and Crisis: Responding to Challenges to Ways of Life in the Contemporary World, Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP)-Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.
Abstract
There are at least two ways to think of the very idea of a way of life. On the first, a way of life is contrasted to life in something like the way conceptual scheme is contrasted to content in Davidson’s formulation of the third dogma of empiricism. To echo Davidson we might say that on this picture a way of life is either what organizes or fits life; where life should be understood as what remains even when all ways of life have been wiped out. On the second, to live for us humans just is to have a way of life. To put it negatively, on this conception, it is not possible to strip human beings of their way of life down to a sort of living which transcends all ways of life; whether this be conceived of as human, animal or bare life, to use Agamben’s often quoted phrase.
In this paper I attempt to strip the first way of thinking of its air of intuitiveness and I sketch of conception on which having a way of life might be what living comes down to in the case of human life.
To do so I first suggest that “a way of life” is represented in terms of what I shall be calling we-judgments or judgments of practice; judgments of the form “We do S”. Then, assuming Michael Thompson’s conception of the logical form of life in general, I present the two lines of thinking above as two conceptions of the logical form of human life. And finally, I argue for two things: First, that the former conception makes human life un-recognizable as such, and second, that the latter conception can do justice to the phenomena of human life, on a certain understanding of a way of life.
The Politics and Theory of Abstract Action,
(under review)
Abstract
I use the term abstract action to refer to the activity of an individual in conditions in which the shared practices that this activity would otherwise embody if successful are now devastated; or else, in conditions of radical social-practical crisis. The transformation of human life in conditions of radical social-practical crisis (what has been described as the precariousness of human life3 or the state of exception4) has been the focus of much contemporary theory. But much of this theory makes gross assumptions about the metaphysics of life and action. Thus, in the first part of the paper I suggest that Agamben’s account of bare or naked life rests on the assumption that an individual may live two kinds of life: the species or formal life on the one hand and the generic or material life on the other. The former is determined by the form of life of the species to which the individual belongs and the latter is is indifferent to any species form of life. But, I argue, the very idea of life is a formal concept, so that it is not possible for any individual to live a generic or material life. On the proposal of this paper, to be active in the way that is recognizable as living just is to embody the form of life of the species to which the individual belongs. Contrary to what Agamben assumes there is no bare or naked life. To live just is to embody the form of life of one’s species. In fact, I argue, what happens in conditions of radical social-practical crisis is not that the individual activity is cut off from its form of life, as Agamben assumes, but that it comes too close to it. For in such conditions, I will explain, individual activity embodies its form of life abstractly: without, that is, the mediation of shared practices. This, I shall explain, is the right way to understand the transformation of life in conditions of radical social-practical crisis.
(under review)
Abstract
I use the term abstract action to refer to the activity of an individual in conditions in which the shared practices that this activity would otherwise embody if successful are now devastated; or else, in conditions of radical social-practical crisis. The transformation of human life in conditions of radical social-practical crisis (what has been described as the precariousness of human life3 or the state of exception4) has been the focus of much contemporary theory. But much of this theory makes gross assumptions about the metaphysics of life and action. Thus, in the first part of the paper I suggest that Agamben’s account of bare or naked life rests on the assumption that an individual may live two kinds of life: the species or formal life on the one hand and the generic or material life on the other. The former is determined by the form of life of the species to which the individual belongs and the latter is is indifferent to any species form of life. But, I argue, the very idea of life is a formal concept, so that it is not possible for any individual to live a generic or material life. On the proposal of this paper, to be active in the way that is recognizable as living just is to embody the form of life of the species to which the individual belongs. Contrary to what Agamben assumes there is no bare or naked life. To live just is to embody the form of life of one’s species. In fact, I argue, what happens in conditions of radical social-practical crisis is not that the individual activity is cut off from its form of life, as Agamben assumes, but that it comes too close to it. For in such conditions, I will explain, individual activity embodies its form of life abstractly: without, that is, the mediation of shared practices. This, I shall explain, is the right way to understand the transformation of life in conditions of radical social-practical crisis.
Us Animals, the Case of Elizabeth Costello
first draft
Abstract
In Jonathan Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, the fictional character of the Australian novelist Elizabeth Costello gives two lectures at the University. The first is entitled "The Philosophers and the Animals" and the second is entitled "The Poets and the Animals."
Elizabeth Costello’s lectures were originally taken by Peter Singer to concern the issue of how we humans treat animals, or else the issue of animal rights. In opposition to this reading, Cora Diamond reads the two lectures as a study of a peculiar sort of wound; the wound of the knowledge of horrors inflicted to the body of life; the sort of knowledge which confronts what Diamond calls “the difficulty of reality”.
In the first part of this paper I argue that the question that Coetzee poses for us – the question we should be thinking of – is this: What is revealed when we think of the issue of the way humans treat animals, together with the peculiar vulnerability to woundedness that human consciousness is subject to? In the second part of this paper I attempt to sketch a first answer: What is thus revealed, I suggest, is the imperative and the difficulty to formulate and inhabit – both as knowers and as agents - the perspective of Us, Animals.
first draft
Abstract
In Jonathan Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, the fictional character of the Australian novelist Elizabeth Costello gives two lectures at the University. The first is entitled "The Philosophers and the Animals" and the second is entitled "The Poets and the Animals."
Elizabeth Costello’s lectures were originally taken by Peter Singer to concern the issue of how we humans treat animals, or else the issue of animal rights. In opposition to this reading, Cora Diamond reads the two lectures as a study of a peculiar sort of wound; the wound of the knowledge of horrors inflicted to the body of life; the sort of knowledge which confronts what Diamond calls “the difficulty of reality”.
In the first part of this paper I argue that the question that Coetzee poses for us – the question we should be thinking of – is this: What is revealed when we think of the issue of the way humans treat animals, together with the peculiar vulnerability to woundedness that human consciousness is subject to? In the second part of this paper I attempt to sketch a first answer: What is thus revealed, I suggest, is the imperative and the difficulty to formulate and inhabit – both as knowers and as agents - the perspective of Us, Animals.
Ethics, Politics and the Standpoint of the Crisis, draft; co-authored with Thodoris Dimitrakos
(please, do not cite without permission)
Abstract
In this paper we address a problem which arises out of a certain possibility: the way of life we inhabit together with others may fail to be inhabitable, and so I can act in a way that is practice-wise meaningless. For Jonathan Lear and Robert Pippin this vulnerability raises the philosophical question of what practical meaningfulness must be like if it can fail in this way. And more specifically the question of what role the shared practices and significances must play in the practical life of an agent if their disruption may render her actions meaningless in this distinctive way. In this paper we will also be concerned with the failure of our shared practices, practical crisis from now on, and its philosophical significance. But we will ask the question of what practical meaningfulness must be like if it can address its own failure. To carry out this task we will first say a few words about the logical status of the shared practices which constitute a way of life and about the predicament their failure gives rise to. Then we will propose that practical meaningfulness is such that it makes sense for an individual agent to intend a shared practice - a thing we do - even in conditions of practical crisis. This proposition faces the up-to-me problem: how is it possible for an individual to intend a shared practice, a thing we do, in conditions of crisis of shared practices, if an individual may only (intend to) do what is up to her? In response to this question we argue that what certain others do may indeed be up to one. But to see this we must distinguish between two forms of shared practice and practical identity. In the first you may determine a shared practice only by instantiating it and in the second you may determine a shared practice you do not instantiate; that is, you may determine a shared practice by instantiating another shared practice.
(please, do not cite without permission)
Abstract
In this paper we address a problem which arises out of a certain possibility: the way of life we inhabit together with others may fail to be inhabitable, and so I can act in a way that is practice-wise meaningless. For Jonathan Lear and Robert Pippin this vulnerability raises the philosophical question of what practical meaningfulness must be like if it can fail in this way. And more specifically the question of what role the shared practices and significances must play in the practical life of an agent if their disruption may render her actions meaningless in this distinctive way. In this paper we will also be concerned with the failure of our shared practices, practical crisis from now on, and its philosophical significance. But we will ask the question of what practical meaningfulness must be like if it can address its own failure. To carry out this task we will first say a few words about the logical status of the shared practices which constitute a way of life and about the predicament their failure gives rise to. Then we will propose that practical meaningfulness is such that it makes sense for an individual agent to intend a shared practice - a thing we do - even in conditions of practical crisis. This proposition faces the up-to-me problem: how is it possible for an individual to intend a shared practice, a thing we do, in conditions of crisis of shared practices, if an individual may only (intend to) do what is up to her? In response to this question we argue that what certain others do may indeed be up to one. But to see this we must distinguish between two forms of shared practice and practical identity. In the first you may determine a shared practice only by instantiating it and in the second you may determine a shared practice you do not instantiate; that is, you may determine a shared practice by instantiating another shared practice.
Finite Movement and Film
(Written for the Film and Philosophy Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, 2014)
Abstract
In Henri Cartier-Bresson's Sunday on the Banks of the River Marne of 1938, an ordinary picnic is held before us as what in vain awaits to be liberated in the progression of movement to its finale. Pouring the wine in the glass; cutting the piece of food; savoring the bite; gazing into the distance; all this will never be completed. Thus, what in the picture acquires the life of a finite purposeful movement (kinesis) is also what in the picture can never be done with, thus taking on the guise of an infinite purposeful movement (energeia).
In William Wyler's The Children's Hour of 1961, Martha has just confessed her hitherto unknown love to her close friend Karen. Karen has left Martha in the house they share. She is walking towards the exit of the estate.
She is walking towards the exit of the estate until she has reached it. The movement that in the still image is bound to remain incomplete is now let through the medium of the moving camera to reach completion. Finite movement seems to finally acquire its finality in film.
And yet, the movement that is being completed in the film is as much Karen’s as it is Audrey Hepburn’s. Audrey Hepburn’s walking may seem to be done with; never again will Audrey Hepburn walk that walk, one may think. But Karen’s walking may seem complete but not done with. Karen forever walks to the exit of the estate, as the moving camera turns the walking into something essentially reproducible. And, this, one might think, is the sense in which finite movement once more becomes infinite in film.
But, I argue in my paper, this is misleading. The sense in which finite movement acquires infinity in film comes to the forefront in the following considerations. To see Karen’s walking to the exit of the estate for what it is one must have seen the entire movie. In this sense the entire movie just is the presentation of this walking. And so if the entire movie can never be done with (and here reproducibility plays its proper role), then the presentation of Karen’s walking can also never be done with, even though Karen’s walking in that very presentation is.
But in the same way that it takes a film to see Karen’s walking to the exit of the estate for what it is, it could take a film to see Audrey Hepburn’s, or our, walking to the exit of the estate, or anywhere at all for what it is. Film shows the kind of infinity that might be there in a finite movement; and it teaches us to be ready for this kind of infinity and know how to read it in any finite human movement. In my paper I use Bresson’s picture and Wyler’s film to clarify this sense of infinity.
(Written for the Film and Philosophy Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, 2014)
Abstract
In Henri Cartier-Bresson's Sunday on the Banks of the River Marne of 1938, an ordinary picnic is held before us as what in vain awaits to be liberated in the progression of movement to its finale. Pouring the wine in the glass; cutting the piece of food; savoring the bite; gazing into the distance; all this will never be completed. Thus, what in the picture acquires the life of a finite purposeful movement (kinesis) is also what in the picture can never be done with, thus taking on the guise of an infinite purposeful movement (energeia).
In William Wyler's The Children's Hour of 1961, Martha has just confessed her hitherto unknown love to her close friend Karen. Karen has left Martha in the house they share. She is walking towards the exit of the estate.
She is walking towards the exit of the estate until she has reached it. The movement that in the still image is bound to remain incomplete is now let through the medium of the moving camera to reach completion. Finite movement seems to finally acquire its finality in film.
And yet, the movement that is being completed in the film is as much Karen’s as it is Audrey Hepburn’s. Audrey Hepburn’s walking may seem to be done with; never again will Audrey Hepburn walk that walk, one may think. But Karen’s walking may seem complete but not done with. Karen forever walks to the exit of the estate, as the moving camera turns the walking into something essentially reproducible. And, this, one might think, is the sense in which finite movement once more becomes infinite in film.
But, I argue in my paper, this is misleading. The sense in which finite movement acquires infinity in film comes to the forefront in the following considerations. To see Karen’s walking to the exit of the estate for what it is one must have seen the entire movie. In this sense the entire movie just is the presentation of this walking. And so if the entire movie can never be done with (and here reproducibility plays its proper role), then the presentation of Karen’s walking can also never be done with, even though Karen’s walking in that very presentation is.
But in the same way that it takes a film to see Karen’s walking to the exit of the estate for what it is, it could take a film to see Audrey Hepburn’s, or our, walking to the exit of the estate, or anywhere at all for what it is. Film shows the kind of infinity that might be there in a finite movement; and it teaches us to be ready for this kind of infinity and know how to read it in any finite human movement. In my paper I use Bresson’s picture and Wyler’s film to clarify this sense of infinity.
The 2008 Financial Crisis and Neo-Aristotelianism; two Types of Moral Criticism
(Witten for the conference on Ethics and Moral Agency in Finance and the Financial Sector: Critical Perspectives in Limerick, Ireland, April 2014 )
Abstract
In this paper I investigate the moralist interpretation of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis and show that it may be taken in a twofold manner in accordance with a distinction between two conceptions of moral virtue. On the first conception, which has its source in one strand of neo-Aristotelianism in 20th century Anglo-American philosophy, the virtues are dispositions of character that enable the moral agent to fit and excel in any given political association. On this conception, the standards of moral excellence are posterior to the standards of political excellence internal to any political organization; and so, if we take the market to qualify as a political association in its own right (along with or in the place of the state), we may meaningfully talk of market actors that succeed or fail to meet the moral standards of free market acting. On this reading, the 2008 crisis was the result of the failure of some of the free market agents to meet the standards of moral excellence prescribed within the free market enterprise itself.
On the second strand of neo-Aristotelianism in the 20th century, the virtues are dispositions of character that develop into excellences only when the agent finds herself in the political association that as a matter of fact allows for this development. On this conception, the standards of moral excellence are posterior only to the standards of political excellence of the best political association; and so the market may indeed constitute its own political association (along with or in the place of the state), but this does not imply that it must be such as to allow for the development of moral excellences. On this conception, the moral regulation of the market may be utopian, for the market may simply be (part of) that political association of which it is as a matter of fact impossible to be a morally excellent citizen. On this reading of the moralist interpretation of the 2008 crisis, this crisis was the result of the fact that the enterprise of free market capitalism is the sort of political environment that fails to provide standards of moral excellence, and so to allow for the development of morally excellent political agents.
(Witten for the conference on Ethics and Moral Agency in Finance and the Financial Sector: Critical Perspectives in Limerick, Ireland, April 2014 )
Abstract
In this paper I investigate the moralist interpretation of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis and show that it may be taken in a twofold manner in accordance with a distinction between two conceptions of moral virtue. On the first conception, which has its source in one strand of neo-Aristotelianism in 20th century Anglo-American philosophy, the virtues are dispositions of character that enable the moral agent to fit and excel in any given political association. On this conception, the standards of moral excellence are posterior to the standards of political excellence internal to any political organization; and so, if we take the market to qualify as a political association in its own right (along with or in the place of the state), we may meaningfully talk of market actors that succeed or fail to meet the moral standards of free market acting. On this reading, the 2008 crisis was the result of the failure of some of the free market agents to meet the standards of moral excellence prescribed within the free market enterprise itself.
On the second strand of neo-Aristotelianism in the 20th century, the virtues are dispositions of character that develop into excellences only when the agent finds herself in the political association that as a matter of fact allows for this development. On this conception, the standards of moral excellence are posterior only to the standards of political excellence of the best political association; and so the market may indeed constitute its own political association (along with or in the place of the state), but this does not imply that it must be such as to allow for the development of moral excellences. On this conception, the moral regulation of the market may be utopian, for the market may simply be (part of) that political association of which it is as a matter of fact impossible to be a morally excellent citizen. On this reading of the moralist interpretation of the 2008 crisis, this crisis was the result of the fact that the enterprise of free market capitalism is the sort of political environment that fails to provide standards of moral excellence, and so to allow for the development of morally excellent political agents.
My dissertation is here: From Conflict to Unity: Motivation and Practical Reason
From Conflict to Unity: Motivation and Practical Reason
Evgenia Mylonaki
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
Dissertation Abstract
In my dissertation I explore the connection between intentional action and practical normativity from the perspective of motivation. I assume that an adequate theory of action motivation should embrace the normative commitment that to explain intentional action is to reveal it to be subject to practical norms. In the first chapter I argue that these are not the norms of so-called instrumental rationality. Against most theories of practical reason I argue that there is no irreducible, action-guiding requirement of practical rationality to take the means to one‘s ends. The normativity of means-end thought is not a type of practical rationality that guides action, but is internal to the elementary structure of intentional action itself. In the second chapter I argue against monolithic theories on which the relevant norms are the norms of non-instrumental practical rationality which are constituted as such by a single requirement: the requirement to approximate or satisfy an agent-general desire, to act in accordance with one‘s judgment about one‘s reasons, or to engage in a single type of practical reasoning. To allow for the possibility of primary motivational conflict, conflict between contrary motivations towards one and the same action at the same time, we have to assume a multi-dimensional theory which posits incommensurable practical requirements at the source of practical norms. In the final chapter I argue that we should explain choice in the face of conflict between these incommensurable requirements in terms of these very requirements alone. Against contemporary versions of Humeanism, Scholasticism and Kantianism I argue that we should not appeal to the existence of a separate purely executive or a more rational capacity for choice to explain how incommensurable practical requirements issue in unified intentional action. Instead, I propose, we should accept that these incommensurable requirements issue in unified intentional action because they constitute potential determinations of practical knowledge: knowledge of oneself as determined in one‘s reasoning about what to do by the right requirement for the circumstances. Intentional action is what meets the requirements of practical rationality, I show, as long as we take these requirements to be both incommensurable and cognitive.
From Conflict to Unity: Motivation and Practical Reason
Evgenia Mylonaki
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
Dissertation Abstract
In my dissertation I explore the connection between intentional action and practical normativity from the perspective of motivation. I assume that an adequate theory of action motivation should embrace the normative commitment that to explain intentional action is to reveal it to be subject to practical norms. In the first chapter I argue that these are not the norms of so-called instrumental rationality. Against most theories of practical reason I argue that there is no irreducible, action-guiding requirement of practical rationality to take the means to one‘s ends. The normativity of means-end thought is not a type of practical rationality that guides action, but is internal to the elementary structure of intentional action itself. In the second chapter I argue against monolithic theories on which the relevant norms are the norms of non-instrumental practical rationality which are constituted as such by a single requirement: the requirement to approximate or satisfy an agent-general desire, to act in accordance with one‘s judgment about one‘s reasons, or to engage in a single type of practical reasoning. To allow for the possibility of primary motivational conflict, conflict between contrary motivations towards one and the same action at the same time, we have to assume a multi-dimensional theory which posits incommensurable practical requirements at the source of practical norms. In the final chapter I argue that we should explain choice in the face of conflict between these incommensurable requirements in terms of these very requirements alone. Against contemporary versions of Humeanism, Scholasticism and Kantianism I argue that we should not appeal to the existence of a separate purely executive or a more rational capacity for choice to explain how incommensurable practical requirements issue in unified intentional action. Instead, I propose, we should accept that these incommensurable requirements issue in unified intentional action because they constitute potential determinations of practical knowledge: knowledge of oneself as determined in one‘s reasoning about what to do by the right requirement for the circumstances. Intentional action is what meets the requirements of practical rationality, I show, as long as we take these requirements to be both incommensurable and cognitive.